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ARGUMENTS 
I. THE RECORD DEMONSTRATES THE TRIAL COURT 
ERRONEOUSLY UTLIZED AN OBJECTIVE STANDARD IN THE 
COURSE OF DENYING MR. KUCHARSKI'S MOTION TO 
WITHDRAW THE NO-CONTEST PLEA, 
The State argues that the Mr. Kucharski's motion to withdraw 
his guilty plea was properly denied. See Brief of Appellee, pp. 
6-18. Based on the record, this argument is without merit for the 
reasons set forth below. 
Generally speaking, an appellate court reviews the trial 
court's denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea for abuse of 
discretion. State v. Benvenuto, 1999 UT 60, %10, 983 P.2d 556. 
However, when, as in the instant case, the trial court's denial 
involves an interpretation of a statute or binding case law, the 
appellate court is presented with a question of law, which it then 
reviews for correctness. See State v. Merrill, 2005 UT 34, 1|l2, 
114 P.3d 585 (quoting State v. Ostler, 2001 UT 68, %5, 31 P.3d 
528) (statutory interpretation) ; Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 1999 
UT 36, Hl7, 977 P.2d 1201 (statutory interpretation); State v. 
Leyva, 951 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1997) (binding case law 
interpretation); and Stevenson v. Goodson, 924 P.2d 339, 346 (Utah 
1996) (binding case law interpretation). 
M
 [T] he substantive goal of rule 11 is to ensure that 
defendants know of their rights and thereby understand the basic 
1 
consequences of their decision to plead guilty." State v. Visser, 
2000 UT 88, ^11, 22 P.3d 1242. Nevertheless, u[t]he trial court's 
compliance with Rule 11 does not foreclose the possibility the 
court abused its discretion in refusing the defendant's motion [to 
withdraw the guilty plea] if his plea was in fact involuntary." 
State v. Thorup, 841 P. 2d 746, 748 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), cert. 
denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993). Moreover, "x for a plea of 
guilty to be valid it must appear that the accused had a clear 
understanding of the charge and without undue influence, coercion, 
or improper inducement voluntarily entered such plea.'" Id. 
(quoting State v. Forsyth, 560 P.2d 337, 338 (Utah 1977)). 
In this case, Mr. Kucharski filed a Motion to withdraw his 
guilty plea, arguing that he did not voluntarily enter the guilty 
plea due to appointed trial counsel's failure to subpoena 
witnesses in preparation for trial (R. 97-101). During a hearing 
on the Motion, Mr. Kucharski testified that appointed trial 
counsel had failed to subpoena witnesses he had previously 
provided to counsel, resulting in him having no other option but 
to plead guilty (R. 208:18-19). 
The State, in its Brief, argues the following: 
At the very least, however, the record 
negates defendant's claim that there was 
"unrefutted testimony" that trial counsel had 
failed to talk to his udefense witnesses prior to 
the scheduled trial." Aplt. Br. 14. Instead, the 
2 
record shows that defense counsel contacted the 
potential witnesses, but then chose not to 
subpoena them only after learning that they would 
not support defendant's story. Defendant's 
mvoluntanness claim is therefore based on a 
false factual predicate. It should be rejected on 
this basis alone. I 
I 
Brief of Appellee, p. 9. This is incorrect. Contrary to the 
I 
State's assertion, appointed trial counsel spoke with only two or 
three of the witnesses provided to him by Mr. Kucharski prior to 
I 
tnal (R. 208:31:10-20; R. 208:32:3-6). In fact, when asked the 
reason that he did not subpoena any of the witnesses, appointed 
trial counsel responded that he did not subpoena any witnesses due 
to Mr. Kucharski's acceptance of the negotiated plea, "which would 
effectively reduce the conviction down to a class A misdemeanor." 
(R. 208:33:1-8) . 
Immediately after the hearing, the trial court denied the 
Motion, concluding that an objective standard is to be exclusively 
utilized in the course of considering a motion to withdraw a 
guilty plea (R. 208:57-58). In the course of its ruling, the 
trial court stated: 
Unless there is something from the Utah Supreme 
Court or the U.S. Supreme Court or the Utah Court 
of Appeals that says that a judge who asks these 
questions, goes through what the judge is supposed 
to go trough [sic] with this form of plea 
affidavit that we have, and gets statements from 
the defendant, I believe that there's no -- no 
standard that says that I have to then go back 
secondhand and say if somebody later after the 
3 
fact says, judge what I told you was a lie and I 
really didn't mean it, that it can't be -- I can't 
see how it can be a subjective standard because if 
it is a subjective standard, then every person 
that we have asked and gone through, you know, 
hundreds and hundreds and hundreds of defendants 
over the last number of years, then every one of 
them can come back and say, well, judge, despite 
that, that wasn't true. 
(R. 208:57-58) . 
According to Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (2) (a) , "A plea of 
guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon leave of the court 
and a showing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made." In 
State v. Thurman, 911 P.2d 371 (Utah 1996), the Utah Supreme Court 
held that the disputed guilty plea was not knowing because the 
defendant did not understand the elements of the crime in spite of 
his unequivocal statements to the contrary. Id. at 375. In the 
course of its holding, the Court emphasized defendant's repeated 
statements that he did not have the requisite intent and his 
specific refusal to admit to certain consequences. Id.; see also 
State v. Martinez, 2001 UT 12, fl8, 26 P.3d 203 (relying on 
defendant's declarations that he "didn't want to go through a 
trial because [he] didn't want to put [the victim's mother] . . . 
through the emotion and go through the hurt" m the course of 
affirming trial court's denial of motion to withdraw guilty plea). 
Further, in State v. Thorup, 841 P.2d 746 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), 
cert, denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993), this Court, in the course 
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of affirming the denial of the motion to withdraw the guilty plea, 
recited the following portion of the trial court's ruling: 
As to the assertion that [defendant's] 
attorney used undue influence, the evidence 
presented shows nothing more than an attorney 
counseling the defendant and his family with 
regard to what he considers to be the best 
approach, knowing all of the facts from the 
defendant's point of view and giving his 
considered judgment and advice to the defendant 
and his family that the plea barg[a]in was in the 
defendant's best interest . . . . The court could 
not find from evidence presented on this question 
that [defendant's attorney] in iny way abandoned 
his representation for economic reasons or because 
of pressures from the family to change his advice 
and reject the plea bargain and enter a plea of 
not guilty. 
Id. at 748 (emphasis added). 
The State concedes that the test for reviewing a motion to 
withdraw a guilty plea "is subjective, not objective," See Brief 
of Appellee, p. 16 (citing State v. Humphrey, 2003 UT App 333, 
U1fl2-13, 79 P.3d 960). Notwithstanding the trial court's explicit 
pronouncement to the contrary, the State argues the trial court 
"correctly analyzed defendant's motion on a subjective basis." 
See Brief of Appellee, p. 16. The record demonstrates otherwise. 
The trial court's failure to address appointed trial counsel's 
failure to subpoena witnesses for trial, demonstrates that the 
trial court utilized a purely objective standard in ruling on Mr. 
Kucharski's Motion to withdraw his plea of no contest. By 
5 
utilizing a purely objective standard in the course of its ruling, 
the trial court misinterpreted the applicable statutory and 
binding case law and thereby failed to consider unrefutted 
testimony that appointed trial counsel did not talk with all the 
potential witnesses and thereby subpoena defense witnesses prior 
to the scheduled trial. Only on the eve of trial did Mr. 
Kucharski learn that none of his requested witnesses had been 
subpoenaed for trial. Consequently, Mr. Kucharski did not enter 
his no-contest plea of his own free will and choice. Rather, the 
plea was entered involuntarily under the duress of appointed trial 
counsel's failure to investigate and subpoena requested defense 
witnesses. 
II. AS CONCEDED BY THE STATE, THIS COURT SHOULD REMAND 
TO THE TRIAL COURT TO RESOLVE MR, KUCHARSKI'S 
OBJECTIONS TO THE PRESENTENCE REPORT. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(6) (a) provides m relevant part: 
Any alleged inaccuracies in the presentence 
investigation report, which have not been resolved 
by the parties and the department prior to 
sentencing, shall be brought to the attention of 
the sentencing judge, and the ]udge may grant an 
additional ten working days to resolve the alleged 
inaccuracies of the report with the department. 
If after ten working days the inaccuracies cannot 
be resolved, the court shall make a determination 
of relevance and accuracy on the record. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(6) (a); see also State v. Maroney, 2004 UT 
App 206, ^26, 94 P. 3d 295. The question of whether the trial 
6 
court properly resolved on the record the accuracy of contested 
information m sentencing reports is a question of law. State v. 
Veteto, 2000 UT 62, Hl3, 6 P.3d 1133 (citing State v. Kohl, 2000 
UT 35, 132, 999 P.2d 7). 
As a matter of compliance, Utah Cod<$ Ann. § 77-18-1(6) (a), 
"requires the sentencing judge to consider the party's objections 
to the report, make findings on the record as to whether the 
information objected to is accurate, and determine on the record 
whether that information is relevant to the issue of sentencing." 
State v. Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, ^44, 973 P.2d 404/ State v. Maroney, 
2004 UT App 206, ^26, 94 P.3d 295. The repord demonstrates that 
the sentencing court failed to duly consider the inaccuracies set 
forth m the Presentence Report. Prioi^ to sentencing, Mr. 
Kucharski, through newly retained counsel, filed an 10-page 
Objection to Presentence Report (R. 138-48). Some of the 
objections appear to have been resolved but, contrary to counsel's 
representation at sentencing, not all of the objections were 
resolved as contemplated by Utah Code Ann. g 77-18-1. 
After recognizing that the objections had been filed, the 
district court subsequently sentenced Mr. Kutharski without first 
LThe State's Brief of Appellee does not address Mr. Kucharski's 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on trial counsel's 
failure to request that the sentencing court Resolve the presentence 
report objections. As such, it is conceded. 
7 
complying with Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(6) (a), as conceded by the 
State. See State v. Veteto, 2000 UT 62, fl4, 6 P.3d 1137 
(sentencing judge's general statement concerning the inaccuracies 
is insufficient). The State, however, argues that the remand 
"should be limited to those objections that allege inaccuracies in 
the sentencing report." See Brief of Appellee, p. 20. This 
request is not only without precedent and contrary to the statute, 
but it is contrary to the plain language of the Objection to 
Presentence Report filed by Mr. Kucharski, which explicitly states 
that the basis for the objections is the "Presentence Report dated 
February 16, 2007 . , . ." (R. 138) . Whether the objections 
pertain to inaccuracies in the Presentence Investigation Report is 
a matter to be addressed and resolved by the sentencing court, as 
contemplated by Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(6) (a) ,2 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, as well as that set forth in the 
previously filed Brief of Appellant, Mr. Kucharski respectfully 
requests that this Court reverse the trial court's denial of his 
2A further issue to be addressed and resolved by the sentencing 
court is whether the Amended Presentence Investigation Report (R. 
223), which was made part of the record on appeal pursuant to the 
State's Motion to supplement the record, has been properly adopted 
and presented by the State of Utah, Adult Probation and Parole 
(AP&P). This is unclear in light of the fact that it is not executed 
by an authorized individual from AP&P. 
8 
Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea and remarjid the case for further 
proceedings consistent with this Court's (opinion. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 16th day^of September, 2009. 
GGINS, P.C. 
Wio^lns 
f€\ forTSyppel lant 
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ADDENDA 
No Addendum is utilized pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 24(a) (11) . 
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